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Abstract—In the control of many autonomous subsystems,
such as autonomous vehicles or UAV networks, a centralized
control may be hindered by the prohibitive complexity, limited
communication bandwidth, or private information of subsystems.
Therefore, it is desirable for the control center to coordinate the
controls of subsystems by designing mechanisms such as pricing,
which makes the local optimizations of subsystem dynamics also
maximize the reward of the total system, namely the social
welfare. The economics framework of mechanism design is
employed for the coordination of the autonomous subsystems. To
address the challenge of dynamics, which are not considered in
conventional economics mechanism design, and the complexity
of private information, the approaches of geometrization and
machine learning are employed, by endowing different geometric
structures to the problem. The theoretical framework is applied
in the context of urban aerial mobility, where the numerical
simulations show the validity of the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent year, the autonomous control of systems has
received substantial studies, particularly, motivated by the
demand of autonomous driving and UAV networks, et al. The
control may involve the coordination of many autonomous
subsystems; e.g., each vehicle is a subsystem which controls
its own dynamics. However, the traditional control theory
faces substantial challenges due to the reasons, which makes
centralized control difficult:
• Complexity: The size of the system under control is
becoming prohibitively large, which may consists hun-
dreds or even thousands of subsystems (e.g., a large UAV
network). One of the reasons is the new generation of
communication systems; e.g., the 5G New Radio (NR)
can support the wireless connection of millions of devices
in the mMTC mode. This complexity brings challenges
to the computing, The trend of edge computing desires
to distribute the computing to the edges, instead of a
centralized computing, thus reducing the burden on the
communications and computing center.
• Uncertainty: Even if the system provides sufficient com-
munication and computing resources, it may still be
impossible for the center to compute the control actions
for the subsystems. It is because some subsystems may
not share private information with the control center. For
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example, if each subsystem is an economical agent, its
utility function may be kept secret, in order to maximize
its own reward. Therefore, the control center needs to
coordinate the dynamics of subsystems subject to the
uncertainties.
We propose to study the coordination of autonomous sub-
systems in the framework of economics. One of the key
problems to be solved in economics is how to design the rules
to maximize the social welfare subject to the uncertainty of
individual agents, as well as their incentives. For example, in
auctions, each agent has its own value on the object, while
it may not want to disclose its true value in the bid. The
mechanism that the agent with the highest bid wins and is
charged at the second highest bid has been shown to be
incentive compatible, which makes disclosing the true value
the optimal bidding strategy. The generic framework of such
economic problems is the theory of mechanism design, which
studies how to design efficient mechanism such that the local
reward maximization of each agent results in the maximization
of social welfare. The most usual mechanism is the pricing of
commodities, such as auctions or digital goods. The mecha-
nism design can also be considered as a distributed computing
problem, in which the center computes the desired function
(e.g., the optimal prices) given the information provided by
the agents. Therefore, it is also highly related to the research
on communication complexity.
In this paper, we employ the framework of mechanism
design to study the coordination of autonomous control of
subsystems, where the private information of each subsystem
is the utility function, and the control center computes prices
according to the responses from the subsystems. Compared
with the standard theory of mechanism design, the following
new challenges are incurred in the context of autonomous
control:
• Dynamics: In traditional studies of mechanism design,
the setup is static. However, in the autonomous control,
the utility functions of different subsystems may change
with their own system states. Therefore, the mechanism
of coordination needs to be adaptive to the system states.
• Complex parameters: In the context of autonomous con-
trol, the private information of each subsystem is the
utility function. The functional space of the private in-
formation makes the design substantially more difficult
than that of auctions in which the private information is
real number (namely the value of object).
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2To address the above new challenges, we employ the fol-
lowing approaches for the mechanism of autonomous control:
• Geometrization: We will cast the mechanism design in a
geometric framework, in which the setup is formulated
as a vector bundle. Moreover, the geometric structure of
mechanism, namely the relationship between distribution,
foliation and level set, will be used to guide the mecha-
nism design.
• Machine learning: The unknown information of each
subsystem needs to be learned from their responses to the
coordination during the operation. The estimation of the
utility function will be accomplished as machine learning
using samples and different assumptions on the geometric
structure.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. System of Systems
B. Game Design for Optimization
In [13] and [14], the goal function, determined by the
actions of multiple agents, is optimized by designing local
games for different agents. The game design is similar to the
mechanism design framework in which the desired output is
also obtained by designing proper games for different sub-
systems. However, the work in [13] and [14] are substantially
different from the studies in this paper in the following aspect:
(a) Goal function: In [13], [14] the goal function is known to
all agents, while in our context the goal function is unknown
due to the private information of different sub-systems. (b)
Communications: In [13], [14] the agents exchange informa-
tion for the purpose of optimization, while the sub-systems are
not allowed to communicate. (c) Dynamics: The optimization
in [13], [14] is stationary, while the sub-systems do not
exchange information in the mechanism design. (d) Privacy:
In [13], [14], there is no private information. The reason for
the distributed computing is the prohibitively high complexity
of the goal function. (e) Incentive: In the context of this paper,
the sub-systems are selfish; therefore, the mechanism design
needs to be incentive compatible. In a contrast, the distributed
optimization in [13], [14] is collaborative in the agents, which
simply follow the given rule.
C. Network Utility Maximization
Essentially the mechanism design is to solve the conflict of
demand and supply. In the context of control of autonomous
subsystems, the coordination is to resolve the conflict of sub-
systems subject to limited resources, such as space in the air
traffic control. Such a demand-supply relationship, as the focus
of studies in economics, has been exploited by F. Kelly in
the celebrated theory of network utility maximization (NUM)
[21]–[24]. Although this generic framework applies to any data
networks, the networking in NCSs is significantly different
from traditional data networks, due to the different sources of
communication demand, and the different purposes of supply:
(A) Demand side: the demand of traditional data network
is explicit, since it directly consists of the requirements of
throughput and delay; meanwhile that of NCS is implicit, since
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Fig. 1: Comparison between the decentralized control and
coordinated control.
the controlled physical dynamics do not explicitly demand
bits and latency; (B) Supply side: In traditional networks,
the freshness of data packets either does not change (e.g., in
elastic-traffic networks without deadline [25], [26]), or changes
with a binary logic (either catch or miss the deadline [27]), or
changes linearly. The major difference between the theory of
NUM and the coordinated control is that the setup in NUM
is linear, namely the social wealth function is the sum of
the utility functions and the constraints of link capacities are
also linear; in a contrast, the coordinated control in this paper
handled more generic nonlinear problems, which is much more
difficult.
D. Decentralized Control
In decentralized control [19], the control actions are taken
by the agents, which is the same as the coordinated control.
However, it is because of the lack of control center and
information collection in the decentralized control. In the
coordinated control, there does exist a center; however, it
cannot directly inform each agent the control action, since
(a) it does not know the utility functions of agents, and thus
the optimal control action; (b) it is the agents that make the
decision. In the decentralized control, the uncertainty is the
lack of global state information, while it is the unknown private
information at each sub-system in the coordinated control.
Moreover, it is assumed that each agent is selfless in the
decentralized control, while each sub-system is selfish and
aims at maximizing its own reward in the coordinated control.
The design of many decentralized control is analytic, while
that of the coordinated control is data driven. These differences
are summarized in Fig. 1.
E. Mechanism Learning
The study on mechanism design was originated by R.
Myerson. A set-theoretic approach was proposed in [11]
for mechanism design; the counterpart for the continuous
value case was described in [11], by exploiting calculus over
manifolds. In [28], the linear programming approach was
leveraged for the mechanism design, with the emphasis on the
incentive compatibility. In [29], a comprehensive introduction
to mechanism design is given. In traditional studies, the
3mechanism is designed using explicit analysis (e.g., linear
programming [28] and level sets [11]) by human researchers.
However, except for the simple case of two agents and a single
object [28], the optimal solutions to most mechanism design
problems have not been identified, probably due to the high
complexity of the problem. In the last two decades, there has
been a trend to design the mechanism using machine learning,
which takes the numerical methodology based on samples and
is coined automated mechanism design (AMD) [1]. Thanks to
the rapidly increasing computational capabilities of modern
computers, there have been substantial breakthroughs in the
area of AMD. Essentially, the AMD approach is to use suffi-
ciently complex functions (e.g., SVM or deep neural network)
to approximate the goal function F (θ1, ..., θn), while keeping
the reports for the agents incentive compatible. The samples
are obtained by randomly generating the private parameters
{θn}n=1,...,N . The output of the learning procedure is the
functions h = (g,p) and {ψn}n in the given forms (e.g.,
neural network). Traditional studies on AMD [1]–[4] use
heuristic searches. The deep learning approach is employed
for AMD in [30], while SVM is applied in [5]. The sample
complexity of AMD has been analyzed in [6]. However, such a
learning methodology faces the following severe challenges in
the context of spectrum markets for communications and sens-
ing: (a) Prior Distribution: In the spectrum market scenario,
the major private parameters are the utility functions of the
agents. If the utility functions are nonparametric, the sample
space is the function space. It is challenging to devise a good
prdistribution for the utility functions, instead of for scalar or
vector private parameters as in existing mechanism learning.
Parameterized functions with predetermined forms may not
well generalize. (b) Offline Learning: Existing mechanism
learning algorithms are mostly offline, without considering
the feedbacks of the agents during the operation. It could
be more effective to learn the mechanism in an online man-
ner, similarly to reinforcement learning. (c) Blackbox: Most
existing mechanism learning algorithms are designed in a
blackbox manner, without exploiting the intrinsic structure of
the mechanism, which substantially decreases the efficiency of
mechanism learning. Law enactment is a real world practice
of mechanism design. A law is seldom set with offline and
blackbox computations with artificial distributions. It is of
ultimate importance that physical laws of mechanism design
be incorporated in the learning process.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the model of system dynamics
and control scheme, based on which a mechanism design
framework is formulated.
A. Model of Dynamics
We consider a system consisting of N autonomous sub-
systems coordinated by a center. We assume a discrete time
dynamics, where the state of subsystem n at time t is denoted
by xn(t) ∈ Rd. The overall system state is the stack of the
individual states, namely x = (xT1 , ...,x
T
N )
T . In the generic
case, the dynamics of subsystem n is given by
xn(t+ 1) = f(xn(t),un(t),wn(t)), (1)
where un ∈ Rd is the control action of subsystem n, wn is
random perturbations and f is the subsystem state evolution
law. Note that we assume that the dynamics of subsystem n
is not directly impacted by the behaviors of other subsystems;
instead, they are coupled indirectly via the coordination of the
center. Our future research will extend to the generic case with
coupled dynamics of the subsystems. A special but very useful
case is the linear dynamics, which is given by
xn(t+ 1) = Anxn(t) + Bnun(t) + wn(t), (2)
We assume that each subsystem n has a von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function Un as a function of the system
state and the control actions1. A special case of the utility
function is the negative of a quadratic function, namely
Un(t+ 1) = −
(
xn(t+ 1)− x0n
)T
Qn
(
xn(t+ 1)− x0n
)
− un(t)TRnun(t), (3)
where x0n, Qn and Rn are the parameters of the utility
function. We consider x0n as the desired system state, while
the matrices Qn and Rn are assumed to be positive definite.
We assume that the coordinator knows x0n, but not Qn and
Rn.
We consider a coordinator which can coordinate the oper-
ations of the autonomous subsystems. It is assumed that the
coordinator can observe all the actions {un}n and states of the
systems {xn}n, while not knowing their utility functions. The
coordinator does not control the autonomous systems using
direct instructions. Instead, it sets a game for each subsystem
n with the payoff Rn(un(t),xn), which is given by
Rn(un(t),xn) = Un(x,u) + T (x), (4)
where Un is the utility of the subsystem itself and T is an
extra reward given to the subsystem. Then, the subsystem n
will take an action u∗n that maximizes its own reward, which
satisfies
∇uRn(u)|un=u∗n = 0. (5)
The mechanism design is how to design the game payoff
rule R(x, ·), in order to maximize the social welfare, namely
max
{Pn(x(t),·)}n
N∑
n=1
Un(xn(t+ 1),un(t))−Ψ(x(t+ 1)), (6)
where Ψ is a regulation function determined by the overall
system state. Note that such an optimization is carried out for
each possible x, or for each time. For simplicity, we consider
only this myopic strategy and leave the long-term reward to
our future study.
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Fig. 2: Elements of the mechanism learning.
B. Mechanism Design Framework
Using the terminology of mechanism design, the elements
of the mechanism are given as follows:
• Parameter space Θ: The private parameter of subsystem
n is the the utility function Un, which is kept to only
itself.
• Game function gn: Since the subsystems are assumed to
be rational, the actions are calculated by each subsystem
by maximizing the reward function, namely
gn(Un,un) = ∇unUn(xn(t+ 1),un(t))− pn(x) (7)
• Incentive Compatibility: The control action is to maxi-
mize the reward and is thus given by
u∗n = (∇unUn)−1 (p∗n) . (8)
• Message space M : There is no explicit message exchange
since the subsystems do not report explicit information
about their private parameters. However, the actions taken
by the subsystems can be considered as the messages,
since they carry information about their own utility func-
tions and are observed by the coordinator. We observe
that the output function F actually depends on only the
gradients {∇unUn}n, thus can also be considered as
a vector field of Rd, which facilitates the subsequent
geometric argument. Therefore, the necessary information
for computing F is the vector fields {∇unUn}n of
different subsystems.
• Output functional F : The output function is the optimal
actions, namely
Fx ({Un}n) = {un(x)}n, (9)
where x is considered as the parameter while the argu-
ment is the set of utility functions. Due to the social
welfare function is given in (6), the optimal price is given
by
{un(x)}∗n = arg max{pn}n
N∑
n=1
Un(xn(t+ 1),un)
− Ψ(x(t+ 1)), (10)
where xn(t+ 1) is a function of xn(t) and un(pn), thus
being a function of un(p) is determined by (8).
1Here we assume that each subsystem is rational and satisfies the four
von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms [33]
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Fig. 3: Illustration of the bundle of vector fields.
These basic elements in the mechanism design are illustrated
in Fig. 2. The major challenges to the mechanism design in
the context of coordinated control are the following:
• Complex Expression: The explicit expression for the
optimal control action, which is determined by (10) and
(8), could be very complicated, or even prohibitive.
• Information Deficiency: The goal function is based on
the knowledge of utility functions. However, the systems
may not disclose them directly to the coordinator. It is
challenging to uncover the information from the observed
control actions.
C. Fiber Bundle Modeling
Different from the standard mechanism problems, the mech-
anism of the coordinated control is dynamic, namely the vector
field ∇unUn changes with time, since Un is dependent on the
position xn. Therefore, we can consider each point (xn,un)
in R2d carrying a vector field ∇unUn(xn). This forms a fiber
bundle2, where the fiber at each point xn in Rd is a vector
field ∇unUn(xn) over the space of un. The generic case is
illustrated in Fig. 3 (a), while the case of xn ∈ R and un ∈ R2
is shown in Fig. 3 (b). Such a geometric model will be used
throughout this paper.
IV. MECHANISM LEARNING: STATIONARY CASE
In this section, we consider the case in which the learning
procedure of mechanism is much faster than the physical
dynamics, such that we can assume that the system state x is
constant. This assumption is valid for cases of slow dynamics.
For theoretical analysis, we assume that, given the games set
by the coordinator, the subsystems reveal their actions but do
not take real actions. Only when the ‘virtual’ actions converge
to a stationary one, real actions are taken to proceed to the next
stage. This polling-action procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4 and
can also allow real actions during the polling procedure.
A. Strategies of learning
The key elements in the mechanism learning include the
message functions {µn} and the decision function h. The
2Informally speaking, a fiber bundle means attaching to each point x in the
base manifold a structure called fiber.
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received message is the observation on the control action
un, from which the coordinator needs to extract the essential
information needed for the computation, namely the gradients
{∇unUn} for the decision making h. Once {∇unUn} is
extracted from the messages, the computation of h, namely the
output prices, is carried out by using (10), which is straightfor-
ward. Therefore, the key challenge in the mechanism learning
is to extract the information on the gradients {∇unUn} from
the observed actions un. The following three strategies for
the learning procedure will be adopted and will be detailed
subsequently:
• Parametric learning: We assume that the utility functions
are quadratic functions (thus the vector bundle has a
special structure) and then learn the parameters from the
observed actions. Note that quadratic utility functions are
widely used in control theory and economics. It also
serves as a ‘reference’ model for nonparametric cases.
• Nonparametric learning based on fictitious play [34]: We
do not need to estimate the utility function; instead, we
allow the sub-systems to play the fictitious play and reach
the corresponding Nash equilibrium in (??).
B. Parametric Learning: Quadratic Utilities
We begin from the case in which the utility functions are
assumed to be quadratic, given in (3). Therefore, the private
information of subsystem n is the matrices Qn and Rn.
1) Message Space: We first study the dimension of message
space for the mechanism design. The following theorem shows
that, in order to achieve the goal function, all the parameters
(elements in the matrices {Qn}n and {Rn}n) need to be
learned. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Theorem 1. For the case of quadratic utility functions, the
minimum dimension of the message space is given by
dim(M) = 2Nd2. (11)
2) Algorithm:
C. Nonparametric Approach: Coordinated Fictitious Play
Now, we consider the nonparametric utility functions. Al-
though the utility functions are arbitrary with mild constraints
(e.g., concavity and smoothness), it is not necessary to estimate
u1
u2
(u10, u20)
level sets
local	game
global	
result
tangent	
plane
Fig. 5: Illustration of the fictitious play and level sets.
the utility functions (or the corresponding vector fields) per-
fectly. One approach to avoid the explicit parameter estimation
is the fictitious play, namely the subsystems play a game
by setting the optimal response to the current actions of
opponents. One expects the dynamics of fictitious play will
converge to the Nash equilibrium (although not necessary) and
thus achieve the optimal mechanism. Note that the subsystems
do not interact with each other directly. Therefore, the game
will be set by the coordinator adaptively.
1) Full Step Fictitious Play: The coordinator sets the
regulation term Ψ as an extra reward for subsystem n, while
fixing the system states of other subsystems. Then, at time t,
subsystem plays a game with the following payoff
Rn(u(t)) = Un(x(t+ 1),u(t))
+ Ψ(xn(t+ 1), {xk(t)}k 6=n). (12)
The action of system n, utn, is given by the solution of the
following equation:
∇unUn +∇unR(·|u−n(t− 1)) = 0, n = 1, ..., N. (13)
If there are multiple solutions to (14), we select the one closest
to ut−1n .
The following theorem describes the convergence of ficti-
tious play to the Nash equilibrium, thus the optimal mecha-
nism. The proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 2. Suppose that all Hessian matrices are positive
definite. Moreover, the gradient is of order ‖u‖. When the
derivatives higher than the second order are sufficiently small,
and the partial derivatives ∂
2R
∂uij∂umn
(m 6= i) are sufficiently
small, the above fictitious play converges to the optimal point.
Remark 1. The condition in the theorem means that the
coupling of the sub-systems are weak. The cost functions of
each subsystem is close to a quadratic function. Therefore, the
level sets are more similar to spheres. The local optimizations
result in directions parallel to the subspaces of the subsystems.
Fig. 5 shows that the sum of the individual directions can still
improve the objective function value.
Instead of the above simultaneous update, the coordina-
tor can also control the games such that the subsystems
update their actions in turns. At time t, only subsystem
n = mod(t,N) + 1 updates its action:
∇unUn +∇unR(·|u−n(t− 1)) = 0. (14)
62) Incremental Fictitious Play: Simulation shows that full
step size and simultaneous fictitious play may not converge,
which is a common phenomenon of fictitious play []. There-
fore, it is desirable to carry out the fictitious play simulta-
neously. We follow the framework of variational inequality,
which is defined as follows: Given a subset K of Rn and a
mapping F : K → Rn, find an x ∈ K such that
(y − x)TF (x) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ K. (15)
If we consider F as the vector field (−∇u1(U1 +
Ψ), ...,−∇uN (UN + Ψ)) ∈ RNd, then x satisfying (15) is
the solution to the Nash equilibrium (Section 1.4.2. in [35]).
In [35], the following simple projection iteration is proposed:
xk = ΠK(x
k + τkF (x
k)). (16)
The iterative projection is shown to converge to the solution
when F is monotone, namely
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≥ c‖F (x)− F (y‖2, (17)
where c is a positive constant, and the step τk is set
0 < inf
k
τk ≤ sup
k
τk < 2c. (18)
Following the framework of variational inequality, we con-
sider
F = (∇u1R1(u), ...,∇uNRN (u)), (19)
where Rn(u) = Un(un) + Ψ(u).
However, the incremental update, similar to the gradient
descent approach, cannot be directly applied to the fictitious
play, since incentives are needed to make the subsystems up-
date their actions incrementally due to the myopic assumption.
Moreover, in the variational inequality framework, the vector
field F is known, while the corresponding vector field is only
partially known in our context (the gradient of Ψ is known,
while that of Un is unknown). This can be implemented in the
design of games. The following two approaches are proposed
in this paper:
• Two-stage play: In the k-th round, two stages of games
are carried out. In the first stage, the game reward for
each subsystem n is set to
Rn(un) = Un(un) + Ψ(un,u
k−1
−n )
− λk‖un − uk−1n ‖2. (20)
Each subsystem n takes action uˆn by solving
∇unUn(ukn) +∇unΨ(ukn,uk−1−n )
− λk(ukn − uk−1n ) = 0. (21)
Then, in the same stage, the reward is set to
Rn(un) = ‖un‖2 − uTnuk−1n
− 2γkuTn∇unΨ(uˆkn,uk−1−n )
+ 2γkλku
T
n (un − uk−1n )
+ 2γku
T
n∇unΨ(uˆk), (22)
which results in
ukn = uˆ
k−1
n − γk∇unΨ(uˆkn,uk−1−n )
+ λk(un − uk−1n ) + γk∇unΨ(uˆk)
= uˆk−1n + γk∇unUn(uˆkn) + γk∇unΨ(uˆk),(23)
where the last equality is due to (27).
• Single-stage play: Before the operation, initialize u˜0. In
the k-th round, we set
Rn(un) = Un(un) + Ψ(un, u˜
k−1
−n )− λk‖un − uk−1n ‖2. (24)
Given the responses {ukn}n=1,...,N , then the coordinator
calculates
u˜k = uk−1 − γk∇unΨ(ukn, u˜k−1−n )
+ λk(un − uk−1n ) + γk∇unΨ(uk)
= uk−1 + γk∇unUn(ukn) + γk∇unΨ(uk).(25)
where the last step is due to (24).
Remark 2. Some rationales in the algorithms are given as
follows:
• The term λk‖un − uk−1n ‖2 in (20) and (24) is to assure
that the new point uˆk and uk not too far away from uk−1
and u˜k−1, respectively. This is similar to the Tikhonov
regularization and the proximal point algorithms.
• The action optimizations in (20) and (24) are to evaluate
the vector field at a given u, by leveraging the known ex-
pression of Ψ, thus facilitating the variational inequality
approach in (16).
For the two-stage approach, we define en(u) as
en(un) = ∇unRn(uˆ)−∇unRn(u), (26)
where uˆn is obtained from un according to (27), namely
∇unUn(uˆn) +∇unΨ(uˆn,u−n)
− λk(uˆn − un) = 0. (27)
And we need the following definition.
Definition 1. We say that a function F : Rn → Rn is co-
coercive with constant c > 0, if
(F (x)− F (y))T (x− y) ≥ c‖F (x)− F (y)‖22. (28)
Theorem 3. For the two-stage approach, suppose that both
the functions F and e are co-coercive with constants c1 and
c2, respectively. If
0 < inf
k
τk < sup
k
τk < 2 min(c1, c2), (29)
the two-stage algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium.
We also notice that we need to select a large λk, such that
e(u) is sufficiently small. The following lemma shows a bound
on the gap of uˆ and u as a function of λk.
Lemma 1. For the solution to Eq. (27), we have
‖uˆk − uk−1‖ ≤ ND
λk
, (30)
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D = max
n
sup
un
(∇unUn(un) +∇unΦ(u)). (31)
Proof. The proof is straightforward. From (27), we have
λk(u
k
n − uk−1n ) = ∇unUn(ukn) +∇unΨ(ukn,uk−1−n ), (32)
which results in
‖un − uk−1n ‖ =
1
λk
∥∥∇unUn(ukn) +∇unΨ(ukn,uk−1−n )∥∥
≤ D
λk
. (33)
This concludes the proof by stacking the inequalities for n =
1, ..., N .
A simpler approach for the incremental fictitious play is to
employ the Tikhonov regularization term directly:
ukn = arg max
u
(
Un(un) + Ψ(un, u˜
k−1
−n )
− λk‖un − uk−1n ‖2
)
. (34)
This is related to the projection based variational inequality
approach. The optimal solution ukn satisfies the following
equation:
λk(un − uk−1n ) +∇R(un,uk−1n− ) = 0. (35)
When λk is sufficiently large, the solution xkn should be
sufficiently close to xk−1n . Therefore, we can expand ∇R as
∇R(un,uk−1n− ) = ∇R(uk−1n ,uk−1n− ) +HR(un − ukn)
+ o(‖un − ukn‖), (36)
where HR is the Hessian matrix of R. Therefore, the update
is
un = u
k−1
n +
1
λk
∇R(uk−1n ,uk−1n− ) +
1
λk
HR(un − ukn)
+ o(‖un − ukn‖)
= uk−1n +
1
λk
∇R(uk−1n ,uk−1n− ) +O
(
1
λk
‖un − ukn‖)
)
,(37)
which is a perturbed version of the projection based variational
inequality approach.
V. DYNAMIC MECHANISM LEARNING
In this section, we consider the case in which the system
states of subsystems change quickly; therefore, there is no time
for the polling procedure in Section IV. The main challenge
is how to leverage the samples obtained in previous operation,
although the system state has been changed; otherwise, there
is no sample to exploit for the current decision. Hence, it is
of key importance to find connections between the current
environment and the history. In this section, we consider
two approaches for this connection, namely the unchanged
parameters and geometric connection in the vector fields.
A. Parametric Approach: Quadratic Utilities
Similarly to Section IV, we assume that the utility functions
are quadratic. The constant parameters play the role of con-
nection between the current environment and the history, thus
providing samples from the history for the current decision.
For computing the gradient, we need to use the fact
∇xxTAx = (A + AT )x and ∇x(f ◦ g)(x) =
(Dg(c))T (∇yf(y)), where D is the Jacobian matrix. Then,
for agent n, we have
∇unUn(xn(t+ 1),un) = −2BTnQn(xn(t+ 1)− x0n)
− 2Rnun(t), (38)
which implies that the optimal action un satisfies
pn = 2B
T
nQnAnnxn(t) + 2
(
BTnQnBn + Rn
)
un(t)
− 2BTnQnx0n (39)
Therefore, we have
Cnxn(t) + Dnun(t) = yn(t). (40)
where  Cn = 2B
T
nQnAnn
Dn = 2
(
BTnQnBn + Rn
)
yn = pn + 2B
T
nQnx
0
n
. (41)
We can rewrite (40) as
Enzn(t) = fn(t), (42)
where En = (Cn,Dn) and zn(t) = (xTn (t),u
T
n (t))
T . Stack-
ing the observations in M rounds to one equation, we have
EnZn = Fn, (43)
where Zn = (zn(1), ..., zn(M)) and Fn = (fn(1), ..., fn(M)).
We further rewrite (43) as
(I⊗ Zn)vec(En) = vec(Fn), (44)
which results in
vec(En) = (I⊗ Zn)−1vec(Fn). (45)
Once En is obtained, we obtain Cn and Dn immediately. The
parameters Qn and Rn are obtained as follows:{
Qn =
1
2B
−1
n Cn
Rn = Dn −Cn . (46)
We also obtain the mapping from the price to the individually
optimal control action:
un(t) = D
−1
n yn(t)−D−1n Cnxn(t). (47)
Once learning the response of subsystems given the prices,
we can optimize the prices in order to maximize the social
welfare. We first assume that the penalty term Ψ in (6) is
zero. Then, in the social welfare in (6), the term related to the
control action un is given by
Wn = −(xn(t+ 1)− x0)TQnAnn(xn(t+ 1)− x0)
− uTnRnun + Ψ(x(t+ 1)) (48)
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Therefore, we have
∇unWn = −2BTnQn(xn(t+ 1)− x0n)
− 2Rnun(t) + A2nn∇xnΨ. (49)
Suppose that u∗ is the solution to the equation ∇unWn = 0.
Then the optimal price pn should be set to
p∗n(t) = Cnxn(t) + Dnu
∗
n(t)− 2BTnQnx0n (50)
B. Nonparametric Approach: Fictitious Play
C. Nonparametric Approach: Connection based Fictitious
Play
We denote by γ(t) the trajectory of z as a function of
time t. Then, when Anm are sufficiently close to I and B
is sufficiently small, we can approximate the discrete time
system as a continuous time one. We assume that the system
of ξn is autonomous, which evolves as
∇γ˙(t)ξn(t) = f(ξn(t)), (51)
where ∇ is the covariant derivative.
To facilitate the tracking of the gradients, we assume affine
connection for the covariant derivative. Then, the problem be-
comes estimating the Christoffel symbol Γkij that characterizes
the connection via the following relationship:
∇ ∂
∂xi
∂
∂xj
=
M∑
k=1
Γkij
∂
∂xk
. (52)
For the covariant derivative of generic vector fields, we need
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Prop.2.2, [20]). For an affine connection ∇ char-
acterized by the Christoffel symbols {Γkij}, and vector fields
X and Y with local coordinates given by{
X =
∑M
i=1X
i ∂
∂xi
Y =
∑M
i=1 Y
i ∂
∂yi
, (53)
then we have
∇XY =
M∑
k=1
X · Y k + M∑
i,j=1
ΓkijX
iY j
 ∂
∂xk
(54)
Fixing k, we consider Γk = (Γkij)ij as a matrix. Then, we
have
Dξkn(t)
dt
= ξ˙kn(t) +
M∑
i,j=1
Γkij γ˙
i
n(t)ξ
j
n(t)
= ξ˙kn(z(t)) + γ˙
T
n (t)Γ
kξn(t). (55)
Here the gradient∇zξkn(z(t)) is dependent on the second order
derivative of Un and is unknown. However, we assume that Un
changes slowly in z and has a small second order derivative.
For intuition, we check the covariant derivative in (54).
We find that the change of the vector field depends on the
following two terms:
• Linear term
∑M
k=1X · Y k ∂∂xk : the change of the k-th
component in ξn depends on only the derivative of ξkn
and the change of the base manifold.
• Quadratic term
∑M
k=1
∑M
i,j=1 Γ
k
ijX
iY j : the change of
the k-th component in ξn also depends on the other
components in ξn.
1) Special Case: Quadratic Utilities: When the quadratic
utility function, as the reference model, is substituted into the
expression, we have
ξx(u) = ∇unUn(xn(t+ 1),un)
= −2BTnQn(xn(t+ 1)− x0n)− 2Rnun(t),(56)
Therefore, when ξ(·,u) moves from x to x + δx, we have
δξ(x,u) = BTnQnAnδx, (57)
which is a linear transform of δx. Therefore, when the utility
functions are quadratic, the affine connection is linear and thus
the space is flat.
When there are higher order cross terms in U(x,u), namely
ξx(u) = −2BTnQn(xn(t+ 1)− x0n)− 2Rnun(t)
−
∑
i
xniKiun. (58)
Therefore, we have
• The linear term becomes a constant
∑M
k=1DkiXi
∂
∂xk
.
• The cross quadratic term vanishes when there are only
quadratic terms in the utility function, and is nonzero
when there are higher order cross terms.
When the utility functions are no longer quadratic, the
connection can be considered as a combination of linear
term
∑M
k=1DkiXi
∂
∂xk
and quadratic term, as a refinement on
the quadratic utility function
∑M
k=1
∑M
i,j=1 Γ
k
ijX
iY j . More-
over, we assume that the linear coefficients {Dki}ki and the
Christoffer symbols {Γkij} are constants (at least locally).
2) Base Manifold (x,u): Now, we consider the base man-
ifold as (x,u) and the utility function derivatives as a vector
field over (x,u). Then, we approximate the differential with
difference, namely
ξj(t+ 1)− ξj(t) ≈ (z(t+ 1)− z(t))T dj
+ (z(t+ 1)− z(t))TΓjξ(t). (59)
which is summarized into
δξ,j = ∆zdj + ∆zΓjξ, (60)
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Fig. 8: Vector field of decomposable utility functions.
and
δξ,j = (∆z ⊗ I)dj + (∆z ⊗ ξ)vec(Γj)
= (∆z ⊗ I,∆z ⊗ ξ)(dTj , vec(Γj)T )T , (61)
which results in
(dTj , vec(Γj)
T )T = ((∆z ⊗ I,∆z ⊗ ξ))+δξ,j (62)
D. Special Case: Decomposable Utilities
We assume that the utility function of each agent can be
decomposed into two parts:
Un(xn,un) = U
x
n (xn) + U
u
n (un), (63)
which is valid for the reference quadratic utility functions.
The decomposability implies
∇unUn(xn(t+ 1),un)
=
∂xn(t+ 1)
∂un
∇xmUxn (xn) +∇unUun (un)
= Bn∇xnUxn (xn) +∇unUun (un) (64)
We observe that the vector field ∇unUn over the 2d-
dimensional space (xn,un) can be decomposed to two vector
fields, namely ∇xnUxn over Rn and ∇unUun over Rn. There-
fore, if we can estimate ∇xnUxn and ∇unUun , then we can
obtain ∇unUn over the much higher base space. However,
the challenge is that we cannot observe ∇xnUxn and ∇unUun
directly. What we observe is the linear combination of the two
vector fields.
θ1
u1(θ1) u2(θ2)
m1(θ1) m2(θ2)
F(θ1,…, θn)
message
input
output
θ2
mn(θn)
θn
m
un(θn)
h
…
…
…
Fig. 9: An illustration of economic mechanism.
Using the vector filed learning discussed in ???, we have{ ∇ˆxnUxn (xn) = ∑ni=1 Γx(x,xi)cxi
∇ˆunUun (un) =
∑n
i=1 Γ
u(u,ui)c
u
i
. (65)
The goal of learning is to optimize the parameters such that
the prediction error is minimized, namely
min
Γx,Γu
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
Bn∇ˆxnUxn (xn)− ∇ˆunUun (ui)− p
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(66)
VI. APPLICATION IN UAM SYSTEMS
VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
APPENDIX A
MECHANISM DESIGN: A SURVEY
A. Generic Mechanism Design
We assume that there are N agents, each having a local
parameter θn ∈ Θn, n = 1, ..., N . A social choice function
output F (θ1, ..., θn) :
∏N
n=1 Θn → Rk is desired based
on the local parameters. Each agent n discloses a message
mn = µn(θn) in a predetermined message space M , where
µn is its message mapping. Each message is the output of
local optimization, namely
mn = {m|gn(m, θn) = 0}, (67)
where gn(·, ·) is the function characterizing the optimization
taken by agent n. Then, the overall message is given by
m = ∩Nn=1mn, (68)
due to the information decentralization. Then, there exists a
function h : M → Rk such that
F (θ1, ..., θn) = h(m). (69)
The whole procedure is illustrated in Fig. 9.
In the context of economics, the mapping µi is equivalent
to a set of equations given by
gn(θn,m) = 0, θn ∈ Θn,m ∈M,n = 1, ..., N, (70)
where gn : Θn × M → Rcn represent cn equations. Here
gn = 0 can be considered as the condition for the optimal
solution to an optimization problem (e.g., maximizing local
reward).
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Fig. 10: Relationships among mapping, foliation and distribu-
tion.
The goal of mechanism design is to find the correspondence
{µi}i=1,...,N . An effective approach for mechanism learning
is to consider the geometry of economic mechanism. The
goal is to find the maps {un} and h to realize the goal
function F , such that F (θ1, ..., θN ) = h(u1(θ1), ..., uN (θN )).
On one hand, the dimension of the message space may be
lower than the parameter space, thus reducing the amount
of needed communications; on the other hand, the message
function un, if not 1-to-1 mapping, can prevent agent n from
disclosing the full information of θn by reporting mn instead
of θn, thus protecting its data privacy. A typical example is
the auction for a single good and N auctioneers. The private
parameter of auctioneer n is its value on the good vn, while
the corresponding message is its bid bn. Note that bn could
be different from vn since the auctioneer may not want to
disclose its valuation on the good. The output function F is the
decision on the winner w and the price p that the winner needs
to pay. A good auction mechanism should set the output (w, p)
properly, such that the honest report bn = vn can maximize
the auctioneer n’s reward.
B. Geometric Structure of Mechanism: Single Agent
It is L. Hurwicz who noticed the geometric structure in the
economic mechanism, which was developed by ? Williams to
develop the calculus based framework of mechanism design.
A quick tutorial is needed to explain this geometric image,
by beginning from the single-agent case (N = 1). Consider a
function F : Rn → Rm. It can be represented by its level sets
S(x) = {x′|F (x′) = x}, each of which has an index, and is
a d-dimensional submanifold of Rn for a certain integer d. In
the terminology of differential geometry, such sub-manifolds
are called foliations. A distribution means a selection of d-
subspace at the tangent space of each point. When the foliation
is 1-dimensional curve (d = 1), the distribution is simply the
tangent lines of the curve. The foliation can be obtained from
the distribution by integration. Meanwhile, the distribution is
orthogonal to the gradient of the function F . The relationships
of mapping, foliation and distribution are summarized in Fig.
10. The diverse representations of the goal function facilitates
the design of mechanisms, and play the fundamental role in
the proposed research.
A naive example is shown in Fig. 11 to illustrate the
relationships among distribution, foliation and mapping, which
is on the allocation of two goods. Here the private parameter
level set (foliation)
tangent 
(distribution)
Price	vector
index
F1
F2
F3 values of mapping
x0
Fig. 11: An illustration of distribution, foliation and mapping.
is the utility function U : R2+ → R, whose arguments
are the allocations of the two goods. The goal function is
F (U) = U(x) ∈ R, where x is a fixed point in R2+. Then,
the agent simply reports the value of utility function, namely
m(U) = U(x). In Fig. 11, the geometry of the mechanism is
shown. The quarter plane R2+ is partitioned into level sets, each
corresponding to a foliation and resulting the same value of
utility (thus being the indifference curve). The utility function
value is the index of the level sets. Three level sets of the
utility function U are plotted, which are assumed to be 1-
dimensional. The distribution D is the tangent lines of the level
sets (foliations). The level sets can be obtained by integrating
along the tangent lines (the distribution). Note that the optimal
price vector (which the gradient of the utility function) is
orthogonal to the tangent line, since p(x0) · x0 ≥ p(x0) · x
(the maximum wealth), and x0 is the tangent point of the
indifferent curve and the budget p(x0) · (x0 − x) = 0.
C. Geometric Structure of Mechanism: Multiple Agents
The above geometric image is for a single agent. In the
generic case of multiple agents, a foliation (level set) is
replaced with the product of the foliation sets of different
agents, while the distribution (tangent) is also replaced with
the product of the corresponding distributions. An example is
illustrated in Fig. 11, where N = 2, k1 = 2 and k2 = 1.
Consider the neighborhood of x = (x1, x2) ∈ R3, where
x1 ∈ R2 and x2 ∈ R. Fix x1, the foliation S2 for agent 2 is
the intersection of the neighborhood and the plane parallel to
Θ2 shown in the figure, while the distribution is along the x2-
axis. For agent 1, the foliation S1 is the level set (independent
of x2) and the distribution D2 is the corresponding tangent.
Then, the overall foliation S and distribution D are given by
S = S1 × S2 and D = D1 ×D2. It is shown in [] that, in a
sufficiently small neighborhood, the relationships among S, D
and F are still the same as the single-agent case. The messages
of the agents are the level set indices. When designing the
mechanism, an effective approach is to find the distribution by
differentiating the goal function and then obtain the foliation
by integrating the distribution. The messages are then obtained
from the indices of the foliations.
For the general case, the level set of agent i is denoted by Si
with dimensional ci+di, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , while the corresponding
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Fig. 12: An illustration of the mechanism.
distributions are denoted by D1, ..., Dn. The overall level set
is the product of the individual level sets, namely
S(θ) =
N∏
i=1
Si(θ), (71)
while the overall distribution is the direction sum of the
individual ones:
D(θ) = ⊕Ni=1Di(θ). (72)
The following theorem (the mechanism design version
of Frobenius Theorem) discloses the geometric structure of
mechanism design:
Theorem 4. Let D1, ..., Dn be C∞ distributions on Θ. Let θ∗
be any point in Θ. There exists an open neighborhood O(θ∗) ⊂
Θ of θ∗, a local coordinate system u : O(θ∗) → (−, )c+d,
and an inverse mapping v = u−1 : (−, )c+d → O(θ∗) such
that the following statement holds for any θ′ ∈ O(θ∗) and
(w′,m′) = u(θ′):
• A maximal, connected d-dimensional integral manifold
S(θ′) of D exists through θ′ in O(θ∗) and it satisfies
S(θ′) = {θ ∈ O(θ∗)|uc(θ) = u(θ′) = m′}
= {θ = v(w,m′)|w ∈ (−, )d} (73)
• A maximal, connected di-dimensional integral manifold
S(θ′) of Di exists through θ′ in O(θ∗) and it satisfies
Si(θ
′) = {(θi, θ′−i) ∈ O(θ∗)|u(θ) = u(θ′) = m′}
= {θ|uc(θ) = m′, uj,dj (θ) = w′j , j 6= i}
= {θ = vi(w,m′)|wi ∈ (−, )d} (74)
• For each i, the rank of Dθiui,ci has rank equal to ci on
O(θ∗).
• The mapping vi : (−, )c+d → Θi depends only on the
values of wi and m and not on the value w−i.
Remark 3. For each i, ci is the dimension of the useful
information for the computing while di is the dimension of
the information that does not contribute to the computing.
The total communication complexity, in terms of dimension,
is
∑N
i=1 ci.
APPENDIX B
MECHANISM LEARNING
In traditional studies, the mechanism is designed using
explicit analysis (e.g., linear programming [] and level sets [])
by human researchers. However, except for the simple case
of two agents and a single goods [], the optimal solutions to
most mechanism design problems have not been identified,
probably due to the high complexity of problem. In the last
two decades, there has been a trend to design the mechanism
using machine learning, which takes the numerical method-
ology based on samples and is coined automated mechanism
design (AMD). Thanks to the rapidly increasing computational
capabilities of modern computers, there have been substantial
breakthroughs in the area of AMD. Essentially, the AMD
approach is to use sufficiently complex functions (e.g., SVM
or deep neural network) to approximate the input-output
relationship F (θ1, ..., θn), while keeping the reports for the
agents incentive compatible. The samples are obtained by
randomly generating the private parameters {θn}n. The output
of the learning procedure is the functions g and {ψn}n in the
given forms (e.g., neural network). The procedure is sketched
in Fig. ??. Traditional studies on AMD include [1]–[4] use
heuristic searches. The deep learning approach is employed
for AMD in [30], while SVM is applied in [5]. The sample
complexity of AMD has been analyzed in [6]. However, such
a learning methodology meets the following severe challenges
in the context of spectrum markets for communications and
sensing:
• Prior Distribution: In the spectrum market scenario, the
major private parameters are the utility functions of the
agents. Due to the complexity of function spaces, it is
difficult to devise a good prior distribution for the utility
functions. Parameterized functions with predetermined
forms may not well generalize.
• Offline Learning: The proposed mechanism learning al-
gorithms are mostly offline, without considering the feed-
backs of the agents during the operation. It may be more
effective to learn the mechanism in an online manner,
similarly to reinforcement learning.
• Black Box: Most existing mechanism learning algorithms
are designed in a black box manner, without exploiting
the intrinsic structure of the mechanism, which substan-
tially decrease the efficiency of mechanism learning.
Law enaction is a real world practice of mechanism design.
A law is seldom set with offline and blackbox computations
with artificial distributions. It needs to incorporate the un-
derstanding of laws (thus the structure) and be refined in
the operation. Therefore, the PI plans to devise mechanism
learning algorithms by exploiting online operation feedbacks
and the geometric structures of mechanism, which will be
elaborated in the details of Task 1.
12
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We consider p1 and the case of scalar A1 and A2, which
satisfy {
A1u1 − ∂P∂u1 = 0
A2u2 − ∂P∂u2 = 0
. (75)
The Bordered Mixed Hessian matrix is given by
BMHA1,A2(p1) =
(
0 ∂p1∂A1
∂p1
∂A2
∂2p1
∂A1∂A2
)
(76)
We simply need to verify whether ∂p1∂A1 = 0 or
∂p1
∂A2
= 0.
Recall that p1 = A1u1; therefore, we have ∂p1∂A1 = u1+A1
∂u1
∂A1
and ∂p1∂A2 = A1
∂u1
∂A2
. Therefore, we need to calculate ∂u1∂A1 and
∂u1
∂A2
.
Taking derivative with respect to A1 on the first equation
in (75), we obtain
u1 +A1
∂u1
∂A1
−
(
∂u1
∂A1
∂2P
∂u21
+
∂u2
∂A1
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
)
= 0. (77)
Taking derivative with respect to A2 on the first equation
in (75), we obtain
A1
∂u1
∂A2
−
(
∂u1
∂A2
∂2P
∂u21
+
∂u2
∂A2
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
)
= 0. (78)
Taking derivative with respect to A1 on the second equation
in (75), we obtain
A2
∂u2
∂A1
−
(
∂u1
∂A1
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
+
∂u2
∂A1
∂2P
∂u22
)
= 0. (79)
Taking derivative with respect to A2 on the second equation
in (75), we obtain
u2 +A2
∂u2
∂A2
−
(
∂u1
∂A2
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
+
∂u2
∂A2
∂2P
∂u22
)
= 0. (80)
Writing the above equations in the matrix form, we have
A1 − ∂2P∂u21 0 −
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
0
0 A1 − ∂2P∂u21 0 −
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
− ∂2P
∂u1∂u2
0 A2 − ∂2P∂u22 0
0 − ∂2P
∂u1∂u2
0 A2 − ∂2P∂u22


∂u1
∂A1
∂u1
∂A2
∂u2
∂A1
∂u2
∂A2
 =
−u100
−u2
 (81)
• If ∂p1∂A2 = 0, we have
∂u1
∂A2
= 0. From the second row of
(81), we have ∂u2∂A2 = 0, which conflict with the fourth
row of (81).
• if ∂p1∂A2 = 0, we have
∂u1
∂A1
= − u1A1 . From the first row of
(81), we have ∂u1∂A2 = −
u1
A1
∂2P
∂u21
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
. Substituting it into the
third row of (81), we have(
∂2P
∂u1∂u2
)2
= A2
∂2P
∂u21
−
(
∂2P
∂u21
)2
(82)
An alternative approach: When the dimension can be re-
duced, for any p1 and p2, for any A1, the level set
A2(p1,p2,A1) = {A2|F (A1,A2) = (p1,p2)|A1} . (83)
is independent of A1. From the first equation of (75), u2 is
also uniquely determined (?). Hence,
A2 = {A2u2 = p2}. (84)
Since A1u1 = p1 and A1 is full rank, u1 is fixed. Meanwhile,
we have A2u2 = p1.
Now, we take an alternative A′1 such that
u′1 = A
′
1
−1
p1 6= u1. (85)
The reason for the existence of A′1 is: suppose that there is
no such an A′1, we have (A1−A′1)u1 = 0 for all A′1, which
is impossible when u1 6= 0. Then, the different u′1 results in
different u′2. The corresponding level set is given by
A′2 = {A2u′2 = p2}. (86)
If A′2 = A2, we have
A2(u2 − u′2) = 0, (87)
for all A2 ∈ A′2, where u2 − u′2 6= 0. This is impossible for
any full rank A2.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. We first assume that the higher order derivatives are
zero. Then, the difference between the object function Un+R
at system n is given by
Un(u
t
n) +R(u
t
n,u
t−1
−n )− Un(ut−1n )−R(ut−1n ,ut−1−n )
= anδun + δu
T
nHnδun. (88)
where a = ∇un(Un + R) is the gradient vector and H is
the Hessian matrix of R as a function of un. Since system n
maximizes the increase of the local object function, it should
select
δun = −1
2
H−1n an, (89)
which implies
Un(u
t
n) +R(u
t
n,u
t−1
−n )− Un(ut−1n )−R(ut−1n ,ut−1−n )
=
1
2
aTH−1n an. (90)
Then, the difference of the social welfares at stages t and
t− 1 is given by
W (ut)−W (ut−1)
=
1
2
N∑
n=1
aTH−1n an +
∑
n 6=m
δuTnHnmδum
=
1
2
N∑
n=1
δuTnHnδun +
∑
n 6=m
δuTnHnmδum (91)
When the elements in Hnm are sufficiently small, the above
difference is positive. Since the higher order derivatives are
also sufficiently small, the difference is still positive, even if
the higher order terms are taken into account.
Therefore, the objective function value always increases.
Since it is bounded, it converges. This concludes the proof.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM ?
First, we need the following lemma (Lemma 12.1.5. [35]):
Lemma 3. Suppose that a series of functions {F k}k are co-
coercive with constants {ck}k, which satisfies
ρ = inf
k
ck >
1
2
. (92)
If all the functions F k have the same nonempty set S of zeros
and
ρ = inf
k
ck >
1
2
. (93)
and
inf
k
‖F k(x)‖ > 0, ∀x ∈ S, (94)
then the sequence xk produced by xk = xk−1 + F k(xk−1)
converges to a point x∗ in S.
Then, we can prove the main theorem.
Proof. We define F k(u) = τk(∇u1R1(u), ...,∇u1R1(u)),
and
F˜ (u) = F (u′), (95)
where u′ is obtained from (27), namely
∇unUn(u′n) +∇unΨ(u′n,u−n)
− λk(u′n − un) = 0. (96)
Then, for two points u and v in Rd, we have
(F˜ k(u)− F˜ k(v))T (u− v)
= (F k(u)− F k(v))T (u− v)
+ (ek(u)− ek(v))T (u− v). (97)
The first term satisfies
(F k(u)− F k(v))T (x− y) ≥ c1k‖F k(u)− F k(v)‖22, (98)
and the second term satisfies
(ek(u)− ek(v))T (x− y) ≥ c2k‖ek(u)− ek(v)‖22, (99)
due to the assumption.
Meanwhile, we have
‖F˜ k(u)− F˜ k(v)‖22 ≤ ‖F k(u)− F k(v)‖22
+ ‖ek(u)− ek(v)‖22. (100)
Therefore, we have
(F˜ k(u)− F˜ k(v))T (x− y) ≥ min{c1k, c2k}‖F˜ k(u)− F˜ k(v)‖22.(101)
This satisfies the condition of Lemma 3. The subsequent
proof follows that of Theorem 12.1.8 in [35].
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM ?
We denote by u∗(x) the optimal control action u at state x.
We assume that the convergence of the algorithm with fixed
x) and initial value u0 satisfies
‖uk − u∗(x0)‖ ≤ Ek‖u0 − u∗(x0)‖, (102)
where Ek decreases with k and is independent of x0 and u0.
For the two-stage and single-stage algorithms, we can write
the dynamics as
uk = uk−1 + F˜ (uk−1,xk−1). (103)
Theorem 5. Denote by λB the maximum absolute value of
the eigenvalues of B. Assume that ‖u‖ ≤ um. We also define
hF˜ = supu,x ‖HF˜ (u,x)‖2, where HF˜ is the Hessian matrix
of F˜ . Then, we have
‖uk − u∗(xk)‖ ≤ min
n
{
hF˜λBnum
1− λB
− hF˜λB(1− λ
n
B)um
(1− λB)2 + 2Enum
}
.(104)
Proof. Fixing an n, we rewrite the error uk − u∗(x) as
uk − u∗(xk) = uk − u¯n(xk,uk−n)
+ u¯n(xk,uk−n)− u∗(xk), (105)
where u¯n(x,uk−n) is the outcome of applying F˜ for n times,
beginning from uk−n and fixing xk.
According to (102), the second term of (111) is bounded
by
‖u¯n(xk,uk−n)− u∗(xk)‖ ≤ En‖uk−n − u∗(xk)‖
≤ 2Enum. (106)
For the first term, we define
δul = ul − ul−1 = F˜ (ul−1,xl−1), (107)
and
δu¯l = u¯l − u¯l−1 = F˜ (u¯l−1,xk), (108)
Then, we have
‖uk − u¯n(xk,uk−n)‖
=
∥∥∥∥∥
n−1∑
p=0
δuk−p − δ ¯uk−p
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
n−1∑
p=0
∥∥δuk−p − δ ¯uk−p∥∥
≤
n−1∑
p=0
HF˜ ‖xk−p − xk‖
≤
n−1∑
p=0
hF˜
λB(1− λpB)
1− λB
=
hF˜λBnum
1− λB −
hF˜λB(1− λnB)um
(1− λB)2 . (109)
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where we used the fact that
‖xk−p − xk‖ ≤
p∑
q=1
λqBum =
λB(1− λpB)
1− λB . (110)
This concludes the proof by choosing the n that minimizes
the upper bound.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Theorem 6. The dimension of the message space for the
computing task in (?) is infinite, if Θ cannot be written as
Θ(u1, ...,uN) = φ1(u1) + ...+ φ1(uN ). (111)
Proof. For notational simplicity, we assume N = 2 and d = 1,
namely the two-subsystem scalar dynamics, which does not
lose the generality. We consider only the computation of u1,
such that the output function F is scalar. Moreover, we assume
that U1(0) is a constant for all possible U ′1, and so is U2. Then,
U1 and U1+C (C 6= 0) are considered to be the same function.
Suppose that (111) does not hold while the message space
dimension is finite. Our goal is to prove that the dimension c1
of useful information, for the purpose of computing, cannot be
bounded. To this end, we assume that c1, c2 <∞. According
to Theorem 4, the level set Si(θ′) is independent of w2,
while d2 > 0. We consider (U1, U2) such that the solution
is (u∗1, u
∗
2). For any u
′
2, we can find a U
′
2 such that the output
is (u∗1, u2). Due to the independence of S1 on U2, we have
S1(U1, U2) = S1(U1, U
′
2) as the level set of u
∗
1. According to
the equation
∂U1
∂u1
∣∣∣∣
u∗1
= − ∂Θ
∂u1
∣∣∣∣
u∗1 ,u
′
2
, (112)
and the arbitrary values u∗1 and u
′
2, we obtain that
∂Θ
∂u1
is
independent of u2. Then, we define
φ1(u1) = W (0, 0) +
∫ u1
0
∂Θ(v1, 0)
∂v1
dv1, (113)
and further
φ2(u1, u2) = Θ(u1, u2)− φ1(u1). (114)
It is easy to show that
φ2(u1, u2)
∂u1
= 0. (115)
Therefore, φ2(u1, u2) = φ2(u2). In this way, we have
Θ(u1, u2) = φ1(u1) + φ2(u2). (116)
This concludes the proof by the contradiction.
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